Standing Committee A

[Mr. Joe Benton in the Chair]

Crime (International Co-operation) Bill [Lords]

Clause 47 - Transfer of UK prisoner to assist investigation abroad

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 103, in 
clause 47, page 27, line 28, leave out 'competent' and insert 'relevant judicial'.—[Mr. Paice.]
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Caroline Flint: I welcome you to the proceedings this afternoon, Mr. Benton. We shared a short time serving together on the Select Committee on Education and Employment when I was first elected to the House and I am privileged to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon.
 Clause 47 deals with outgoing requests from the United Kingdom for prisoners to be transferred from the UK to another country. In transfer cases, the competent authority making the transfer might not be a judicial authority in one of the countries involved. It need not even be a judicial authority. The mutual legal assistance convention requires that type of request to be transmitted between central authorities, not directly between judicial authorities. 
 When a prisoner is to be transferred from the UK under the clause, the request will be made by the prosecuting authority. The authority making the request will depend on the circumstances of the case. In a police investigation, the Crown Prosecution Service will issue the request on their behalf; in a Customs investigation, Customs will issue its own request as it is designated as a prosecuting authority. When a prisoner is transferred to the United Kingdom at the request of another state under clause 48, the request and practical arrangements will be handled by the UK central authority and the Prison Service, which will liaise with the prison in which the prisoner is held. There is no involvement of a judicial authority at the UK end. 
 While the authority at the requesting end of the process will be a competent judicial authority, a different non-judicial authority could—and, in the case of the UK, does—deal with the request at the executing end. It will therefore not be appropriate to refer only to judicial authorities for that reason. 
 We have not sought to define ''competent authority'' because we do not wish to exclude appropriate authorities that have the authority to deal with such transfers. We are satisfied that that will not lead to a situation in which we execute requests from inappropriate authorities. All such requests must 
 be routed by the central authority, the Secretary of State, in the requesting and the requested state, providing a check at both ends of the process that the request comes from a valid and appropriate authority. I hope that I have reassured the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Paice).

James Paice: Will the Minister confirm that the request will come from another country via the Government of that country before it reaches our Secretary of State? Clause 47 states that the Secretary of State
''pursuant to an agreement with the competent authority of a participating country'',
 as though it is the authority that will make the request. The hon. Lady seems to be saying that that is not so, but that it will come via the Government of that country, so that we will know that it is a genuine request.

Caroline Flint: My understanding is that the central authority of the country concerned would be responsible for authorising the order. I shall seek further information on that point from my officials, who are writing quickly as I speak. I shall clarify the situation.

David Heath: While the Minister is considering her response to the hon. Gentleman, perhaps she can answer this question. What would the situation be in the case of a federal authority when the prison system, or the prosecuting authority is under the control not of central Government, but of the Länder or whatever?

Caroline Flint: My officials suggest that if a request were issued by a judicial authority, it would come via the Government. The arrangement will be with a competent authority, although not necessarily the Government, and the initial request will be sent via the central authority. I hope that that clarifies matters. If it does not, I shall write to the hon. Gentleman to clarify for all Committee members what that means.
 We are keen to ensure that things are dealt with properly, whether by the judicial authority or a competent authority, for example, the Prison Service. We would not want anything to prejudice either a case or the outcomes we want from the Bill.

James Paice: I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Benton.
 I am grateful to the Minister and I congratulate her on her quick learning and nifty footwork in the ministerial role. I think that she has answered the question, but I am still a little bit confused. She was, of course, unable to answer the intervention from the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath). 
 I share the Minister's objective. We do not want things to go wrong. Similarly, as I explained on introducing the amendment briefly before we broke for lunch, I am concerned—just on the off-chance—about a request from an authority that was not genuine being properly checked. That was why I sought an explanation of the definition of the word ''competent''. Perhaps the Minister could consider that matter again and write to the Committee with a clear explanation of how it would operate and who 
 might be the authorities. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 144, in
clause 47, page 27, line 37, at end insert— 
 '( ) subject to any other restriction applied by a court in the United Kingdom that might prevent him from travelling to the relevant participating country.'.
 I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Benton. 
 I fear that this might fall into the class of amendments that I have tabled, to which officials respond, ''I do not know what he is talking about.'' That happened to the previous amendment and elicited quite a useful debate. Therefore, let me explain. I am simply probing the Minister on a serious point, rather than seeking an amendment to the Bill in the specific form that I have used. 
 The purpose of the clause is to allow people who are held by the British judicial system whose assistance is required in an overseas investigation or proceedings to go to that country in order to help. The prisoner, who may be on remand, has to agree to that request, after which the transfer would take place. 
 There could be instances in which somebody who was required to assist with an investigation abroad would be held in the UK, not by virtue of being in detention in a prison, but by other legal instruments now available to the sentencing authorities. For example, certain categories of offenders may have had their passports confiscated, or they could be in custody plus, which is being debated as part of the Criminal Justice Bill. There might be restrictions on their movements, or reporting requirements, that would prevent them from travelling abroad. They are not free agents. They cannot themselves answer a request to assist in an investigation abroad, but neither are they in the classes defined in clause 47(2)—a person serving a sentence, awaiting trial, or incarcerated for being in default of payment of a fine. I may be wrong, but I understand that there is currently no provision for British judicial authorities to accommodate such circumstances. It would be sensible if there were. If there were a request from overseas for someone who was prevented, by virtue of a sentence, from travelling abroad to assist with an investigation, there ought to be some way of temporarily setting aside that sentence, in the same way as is suggested for the transfer of prisoners, in order for that mutual assistance to be made. 
 I do not know whether alternatives are already in statute—if they are, I am not aware of them—and this has not been debated in the context of the Criminal Justice Bill where, as I have said, a new range of sentencing measures has been discussed. This is the obvious place for a provision to be made to allow a sentence to be temporarily suspended for the purpose of giving assistance abroad. 
 I hope that I have made a constructive suggestion to the Minister, because we should at least think about this.

Lady Hermon: The hon. Gentleman raises a valid point. I rise to ask him to address one category of prisoner—those who were released under licence and strict conditions under the Belfast agreement. Could the Republic of Ireland call things into question and require one of those prisoners to go to the Republic of Ireland?

David Heath: As always, I am grateful to the hon. Lady for bringing her experience in Northern Ireland to bear. I do not know the answer to that, and I wonder whether the Minister will have one to hand because it is a more complex issue than it might at first appear to be.
 I hope that this is a helpful amendment in terms of eliciting a debate. It might be necessary to return at a later stage with proposals to fill in the lacuna in the present arrangements.

Caroline Flint: It will be useful to try to clarify this situation. In preparing for this afternoon's exchange, I and my colleagues were trying to think of examples that would be relevant to the points that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome raises. One such example that we came up with was if someone has been found guilty of football hooliganism, and is therefore barred from leaving the country. However, during our discussions on that, we felt that if someone were in custody—for example, they could be a prisoner and already have that restriction placed upon them—the fact that they would be in custody would mean that there would not be free access to travel and travel would be under supervision and in a custody situation.
 Clause 47 provides for us to transfer prisoners abroad to assist with UK investigations into an offence that has been committed in the UK. It is unlikely to be used frequently, but it could be used where, for example, a prisoner is required to identify a site or participate in an identification parade overseas. Existing provisions under the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 provide for prisoners to be transferred from the UK to another state at that state's request and from other states to the UK at our request. This new provision—along with clause 48—implements new obligations under the mutual legal assistance convention that build on and extend those existing arrangements for the transfer of prisoners. 
 This amendment is unnecessary. For the transfer to take place, the competent authorities of both participating countries need to agree the terms of the transfer so that custodial provision can be made in the requesting state. To safeguard the rights of the prisoner, subsection (4) specifies that a prisoner, or someone acting on their behalf, must provide written consent to agree to be transferred in this way. 
 Amendment No. 144 would impose a limitation that the subsection applies to a prisoner 
''subject to any other restriction applied by a court in the United Kingdom that might prevent him from travelling''.
 That is unnecessary. For any prisoner to be transferred, there must be an agreement between the competent authorities here and in the country to which they are to be transferred. Furthermore, these outgoing transfers will be made at the request of the 
 UK authorities. If a prisoner were not allowed to travel, it is clear that they could not be transferred—that would be a breach of the order. It is difficult to envisage the circumstances in which someone in custody will be subject to specific restrictions on travel, as they will clearly be unable to travel as they are in custody anyway. I hope that that has clarified our position. 
 The provision covers a specific requirement under the mutual legal assistance convention and the Council of Europe's second additional protocol to transfer prisoners. There may be other categories of persons who are not allowed to travel, but we cannot request their transfer overseas on the basis of the agreements that we are implementing.

Lady Hermon: I take this opportunity—my first—to congratulate the Minister on her appointment. I wish her well.
 I should like the Minister to clarify a couple of points, one of which relates to my intervention on the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, who speaks for the Liberal Democrats. Can the Minister confirm whether the provisions of subsection (2) apply to those prisoners who were released under the Good Friday agreement? Secondly, can she clarify whether there is a limit on the time that a prisoner who leaves the United Kingdom to go to another requesting country can be out of this country? I am conscious of our human rights obligations to maintain rights to family life, even for prisoners.

Caroline Flint: I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. I shall follow up the issue about prisoners who have been released on licence in writing. On time limits, the provisions of the Bill, and similar provisions for other member states, are in line with the European convention on human rights. The Bill has also been scrutinised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
 The answer to the question on Northern Ireland is, no, the provisions do not apply. The people to whom the hon. Lady referred are not serving a sentence in prison, nor do they fall under any other category of subsection (2), so the subsection would not apply.

David Heath: I am grateful for the Minister's reply so far as it went. I do not want to be unkind to her, but I think she misread the point of my question, and that is probably my fault for not having explained it fully.
 My amendment clearly does not qualify those categories already contained in clause 47(2), but adds to persons 
''(a) serving a sentence in a prison,
(b) in custody awaiting trial or sentence, or
(c) committed to prison for default in paying a fine''
 the further category of those persons who are sentenced to an order that prevents them from travelling abroad. The Minister is right to say that that category does not fall within the letter of the mutual legal aid agreement. However, it raises the point that a request from a participating country for assistance in an investigation from someone who is subject to a travel restriction could not be granted. That person could not assist even if they wanted to, 
 because they would be subject to a restriction applied by a court in the UK. The only way that the person could assist would be if the court in the UK lifted the restriction. The clause is not as helpful as it might be in terms of mutual assistance. 
 I do not want to prolong the debate, but I should like the Minister and her officials to examine the record of previous debates in order to understand what I am struggling to say. There is a gap, which perhaps no one has any intention of filling—it is just bad luck if the crucial witness in an investigation happens to be football hooligan who has had his passport confiscated and cannot be transferred abroad. If that is the case, so be it. However, I thought that the intention was to provide maximum legal assistance. Increasingly, we are using novel forms of sentencing that do not include incarceration, or include it only as part of the sentence, and increasingly people will be subject to other orders of various kinds that will prevent them providing assistance. 
 I shall happily sit down if the Minister wants to make another speech, or I can move towards withdrawing my amendment. I should be interested to hear any further information that she may have.

Caroline Flint: I am afraid that I beg to differ on the necessity of the amendment, but before we complete consideration of this part of the Bill, I should say, in answer to the question on time scales and family life, that there is no time scale. Any time that a participator in such activities served in a prison would be deducted from their sentence, and would count as custody. It would be considered part of their custody arrangement, so there would be no add-on time to their sentence. Also, it should be remembered that the prisoner has to agree to the transfer.

David Heath: That does not take my argument any further forward. I have ground to a halt. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 145, in
clause 47, page 28, line 5, at end insert— 
 '( ) Before making any written statement under subsection (4), the prisoner must be offered access to legal advice on the legal consequences of a transfer'.
 This amendment is at least easier to understand. Its meaning is self-evident; at least, I hope so. It simply requires the prisoner to be offered access to legal advice on the consequences of signing the written statement consenting to transfer. I think that in debate in the other place—I do not have the reference to hand—there was a suggestion that such advice would usually be available to prisoners. However, it should invariably be available. The prisoner might not avail himself of that opportunity, but clearly there are potential legal effects of travelling abroad to assist with an investigation. The prisoner does so as an expression of his own free will; there is no compulsion whatever for the prisoner to be transferred for that purpose, as we clearly understand from the Bill. Therefore, before they do so, they ought to have the benefit of legal advice as to whether that is a sensible thing for them to do or not, because the consequences 
 could be serious for them. That is exactly what my amendment says. 
 I hope that the Minister will, if not accept the amendment, at least give a clear undertaking that that legal advice will always be forthcoming before such a consent is signed.

Caroline Flint: The amendment would ensure that the prisoner whose transfer is sought has access to legal advice. As the Government have made clear in relation to earlier clauses, we do not consider that any provision in part 1 merits automatic provision of legal advice, or that it should be included in the Bill. There is no such provision in relation to proceedings before our domestic courts.
 I refer the hon. Gentleman to the Hansard report of an earlier sitting. In relation to clause 31, my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, North-East (Mr. Ainsworth) said: 
''Under domestic law, there is no obligation for anyone appearing as a witness to seek legal advice, nor is there any automatic right to it. It would not be right or consistent to require that a person has received legal advice in such circumstances, when the UK does not require that in respect of domestic criminal proceedings, either for witnesses, whether willing or unwilling, or even defendants, who are not covered by the provision.''—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, 12 June 2003; c. 141.]
 Prisoners in those circumstances are of course free to seek legal advice in relation to any transfers, both under the 1990 Act and under the Bill. However, we do not believe that that should be set out in statute, and therefore we see no merit in having special arrangements for the new transfers.

David Heath: I am rather disappointed in that response, because clearly a prisoner is in a different situation from other individuals in the country; he is in a prison, where he does not have free access to the same facilities as someone who is not in a prison. My amendment does not say that prisoners must be given legal advice; it says that they must have access to it. In other words, a prisoner should not be debarred from seeking legal advice before signing the important consent. That is a fundamental issue for a prisoner who is not entirely a free agent—at least, I hope that he is not, because if he is, prison would not be serving its useful function. A prisoner cannot make an informed consent if he does not at least have access to legal advice, regardless of whether he avails himself of it.
 I am disappointed that the Minister has prayed in aid, clearly on advice, the different circumstances of the earlier clause that apply to a person offering to give evidence over a telephone. She was not referring to a person being taken to a different jurisdiction, which is covered by the clause, nor his movement and actions being restricted because he was a prisoner. It was not an analogous case. 
 I had expected the Minister to say that, of course, under the British Prison Service, there would be no question of a prisoner not having access to legal advice in circumstances in which he was being asked to consent to being taken to a foreign jurisdiction to assist with an investigation. I also expected her to say 
 that it was unnecessary for such matters to be written into the Bill, because such action is the invariable practice of the British Prison Service. I would have then asked her to put such a provision in the Bill because it would be an additional safeguard if a change came about in British prison practice. However, the fact that she did not say that worries me greatly.

James Paice: I support the hon. Gentleman and endorse the fact that we are talking about matters that are in a completely different league of seriousness compared with giving evidence by telephone. I draw his attention to the record of last Thursday afternoon's sitting when the former Minister made light of a similar amendment in respect of the telephone on the basis that we were talking only about giving evidence voluntarily over the telephone. We are now discussing a different problem and the Minister should note the imbalance between what her colleague said last Thursday and what she is now saying today.

David Heath: I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's support. The issue is important. We have not pursued many amendments to their logical conclusion in Committee, but I hope that the Minister will make a further contribution to our deliberations and explain the situation.
 There is all the difference in the world between a person offering to pick up a telephone, albeit under the conditions of court proceedings, to give evidence from the security of his own country, and a prisoner who is taken from his cell to travel across the sea to another country and provide evidence in that jurisdiction. That person purports to have given consent to that procedure, but has not been given the opportunity of legal advice. I do not believe that the British judicial and penal system would allow that to happen. All I am really asking is for the hon. Lady to say that she does not believe that a prisoner would not be granted access to legal advice before signing the consent. She may wish to make another contribution to the Committee, so I shall sit down and let her do so.

Caroline Flint: I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Prisoners can seek legal advice. It is just not automatically offered to all prisoners who are subject to transfer requests. There is nothing to stop them obtaining legal advice. I am referring to United Kingdom investigations in which for some reason a UK prisoner is needed as a witness overseas. As with any other UK investigation or prosecution, legal advice may be sought, but it is not automatically available. I stress that we are discussing UK investigations and UK requests.

David Jamieson: It is as simple as that.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that it is as simple as that. It may look like that from the Department for Transport but, without wishing to be unkind, I think that it is rather more complex than he suggests.
 My amendment does not state that the prisoner must be offered legal advice: it states that 
''the prisoner must be offered access to legal advice'',
 which is different. The important point is that a prisoner who wishes to have legal advice before signing the consent must be able to have access to it. That is all that I am seeking to include in the Bill. 
 Does the Minister wish to intervene again?

Caroline Flint: No.

David Heath: The Minister does not. That is a great misfortune. It means that I will have to seek press the amendment to a Division at some stage, and now is as good a time as any.
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 12.

Question accordingly negatived.

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 58, in
clause 47, page 28, line 9, leave out 'cannot' and insert 'may'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 59, in
clause 47, page 28, line 9, leave out 'cannot' and insert 'may in exceptional circumstances'.
 No. 60, in 
clause 47, page 28, line 9, after 'withdrawn', insert 'on medical grounds'.
 No. 61, in 
clause 48, page 29, line 3, leave out 'cannot' and insert 'may'.
 No. 62, in 
clause 48, page 29, line 3, leave out 'cannot' and insert 'may in exceptional circumstances'.
 No. 63, in 
clause 48, page 29, line 3, after 'withdrawn' insert 'on medical grounds'.

James Paice: I trust that the Minister will not be too flushed with her first success in a Division. She should not get too carried away and always turn against the logic of the arguments from Opposition Members.
 Amendments Nos. 58, 59 and 60 address clause 47. Amendments Nos. 61, 62 and 63 are virtually identical and apply to clause 48. I will speak about amendments Nos. 58, 59 and 60 and the Committee can take it as read that the same arguments apply to the following three amendments to the following clause. 
 Amendment No. 58 can stand alone, but it can also go with amendment No. 60. However, amendment No. 60 on its own is meaningless; it requires amendment No. 58. Amendment No. 58 would make a fundamental change to the issue of consent in clause 47 with regard to being transferred abroad. Subsection (6) states: 
''Such consent cannot be withdrawn after the issue of the warrant.''
 There are no ifs or buts there, and I want to press the Minister as to whether the Government believe that there are no circumstances in which it might be withdrawn. 
 Amendment No. 58 would simply replace ''cannot'' with ''may'' so that consent may be withdrawn after the warrant has been issued. That would make it an open subsection but, nevertheless, it would meet the requests of the Law Society, which has raised this issue with us. It is opposed to a provision that makes giving consent an irrevocable act. Of course, it is understandable that we do not want prisoners to say regularly yes, no, yes, no; that would be making a mockery of the legislation. However, it is a long way from that situation to the clear irrevocability of subsection (6). 
 I also ask the Minister for an explanation of how the subsection sits with the Human Rights Act 1998. My reading of the provision is that such a statement of irrevocability might well be construed as going against the human rights of the person concerned, if they are not allowed to change their mind in any circumstances. I will be interested to hear how the Minister responds to that. 
 Amendment No. 60 would insert, after ''withdrawn'', the phrase ''on medical grounds''. Taken with amendment No. 58—the two would have to go together—subsection (6) would be changed to read, ''Such consent may be withdrawn on medical grounds after the issue of the warrant.'' The open-ended nature of ''may be withdrawn'' would be narrowed considerably if we inserted an amendment to say that consent can be withdrawn on medical grounds only. Civil justice almost requires that that should be included. Most people would accept that it would be reasonable for the issue to be revisited if someone were taken ill, or if an existing condition deteriorated after the prisoner had given consent.

Lady Hermon: I support the hon. Gentleman's amendment, but it is drawn too narrowly. I am thinking in particular of a prisoner who is to be transferred out of the United Kingdom into a different jurisdiction. Family members of those who give evidence in a serious criminal case can easily be intimidated. I speak from experience in Northern Ireland. People have been murdered because a family member was to be a witness in a case.

James Paice: I am grateful to the hon. Lady. If she bears with me, perhaps I can convince her of the wisdom of amendment No. 59, which I shall come to in a minute; that provides another way. We have tabled a menu of options, designed to test what has been described as the iron-clad wording of the subsection, and whether the Government really mean it to be as total and absolute as it is at present.
 When the matter was debated briefly in the other place, the Government stated that an ill or mentally unstable patient would not be required to travel, as they would not be of much use anyway. However, that is giving someone else the duty of making a judgment on whether that is the case. I also think that it is pretty 
 offensive to suggest that someone who happens to be ill would not be of much use. It does not necessarily mean that their mental faculties would be impaired. Presumably they are not; that is why they are being transferred. I frankly do not accept that as a valid argument. The debate is about the individual's consent, not about someone else deciding whether a person should go. It is about whether the individual's consent, once given, should be withdrawn. 
 Amendment No. 59 is the other option on the menu. Perhaps the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) will have a preference for it. The amendment suggests that instead of talking about ''may'' or ''medical grounds'', we should leave out ''cannot'' and insert ''may in exceptional circumstances''. Obviously, it is not as wide open as ''may'', which we originally suggested in amendment No. 58, but it is certainly nothing like as narrow and restricting as the exception on medical grounds. I venture to suggest that the sort of circumstances that the hon. Lady has referred to, such as intimidation of family members, would qualify as exceptional. 
 The basic point that I am trying to explore with the Government through the amendments is why the Government believe that the giving of consent should be absolute. Nobody wants the clause to become inoperable though the individual withdrawing consent, giving it and withdrawing it again. There should, however, be some opportunity for that to be revisited in exceptional circumstances. I am relatively relaxed about whether the phrase, ''may in exceptional circumstances'' is included, or whether exceptions would be limited to medical grounds, although I note the hon. Lady's comments. I am equally concerned that to leave it as it is would be too absolute—it needs to be changed. 
 As I said earlier, amendments Nos. 61 to 63 are repeat amendments to be applied to clause 48 in slightly different circumstances.

Caroline Flint: As has been outlined in the debate so far, the amendments seek to make the same changes to the clauses on outgoing and incoming requests for the transfer of prisoners—clauses 47 and 48 respectively. Those clauses deal with circumstances in which the transfer is made from one country at its own request when its investigations require a prisoner's presence in another country. It is envisaged that such circumstances would be very rare.
 The clauses as they are currently drafted require the prisoner to provide written consent to any transfer before it takes place. That builds in, from the outset, some serious consideration by the person who is questioned about voluntarily agreeing to take part in a transfer. If such consent were granted, the arrangements for the transfer would be put in place by the authorities concerned. The Secretary of State would, after those arrangements were in place, issue a warrant authorising the transfer of the prisoner. After the issuing of the warrant, the prisoner would be unable to withdraw his consent. There would be a long process up to the warrant being issued, during which 
 the prisoner may still withdraw his consent to take part. 
 I understand what the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Paice) said. He has put it on the record that he does not want to encourage a cat-and-mouse game being played with the Bill and the ability to transfer prisoners. However, we are concerned that the amendments might, in certain circumstances, allow a prisoner to withdraw his consent after the issue of the warrant. The Government appreciate that the amendments are intended to protect the rights of the prisoner. However, the Joint Committee on Human Rights did not comment on that issue. Furthermore, the Secretary of State is also bound by the Data Protection Act 1998. The amendments would create some potentially serious problems. 
 There are many steps in the process up to the final point at which the warrant is issued. As a general principle, we do not think a prisoner should be able to withdraw his consent after he has granted it, for the practical reason that if he withdrew his consent during the transfer, that would invalidate the warrant, which would mean that the prisoner was not held in legal custody. 
 All Committee members would agree that a prisoner who gave consent should not be transferred if, between the time of giving consent and the date of the transfer, he became ill and was unfit to travel. There might be other exceptional circumstances in which, even if the prisoner had consented, it might not, in the end, be appropriate for him to travel. For example, there may be a national emergency in the destination country. We do not, however, agree that it is necessary to provide for the prisoner to withdraw his consent in such circumstances. If that happened, the warrant simply would not be issued. The Secretary of State provides a final safeguard in such procedures. 
 The UK authorities would not transfer a prisoner if he were not medically fit to travel. He would not be transferred if a doctor did not to agree—even if he insisted that he were well enough to travel. In such circumstances there would be certain issues around the custodial arrangements and protecting the prisoner. Not only would it not be in the interests of the prisoner to be transferred if he were unfit to travel, but it would not be in the interests of the investigators. 
 There is no need to provide for the possibility of the withdrawal of consent. In the event that the prisoner became unfit to travel, the transfer would be suspended or cancelled. The warrant is generally issued at the very end of the process—just before the transfer would take place. It would not be used if the prisoner were unable to travel. Under such circumstances, to go through a long process, during which authority on different levels was sought, only for a prisoner to say at the final hour that he will not take part in the transfer, would perhaps undermine the Bill and the reasons for the transfer. 
 The clauses reflect the terms used in sections 5 and 6 of the 1990 Act, and the provision relating to consent reflects the position under that Act. So far as I am aware, there have been no practical problems in relation to that issue.

James Paice: I am grateful to the Minister for her reply. She stated that the Government do not feel that as a general principle people should be able to withdraw consent. I agree. As a general principle, they should not be able to withdraw consent, but there are exceptional circumstances.
 Although I acknowledge the Minister's point that the warrant is produced only at the last minute—I am not sure how last-minute it is, but I accept that it would be towards the end rather than at the beginning of the process—there are still occasions when something occurs between the issuing of the warrant and its execution. Family intimidation, to which the hon. Member for North Down referred, is a clear example. The prisoner might get a message at the very last minute to say that if he attends something will happen to a member of his family. I am not suggesting that I want to allow people to change their minds by making up stories, but the Government need to reflect on whether they want to be as absolute as they are being at present. If an eventuality such as the one to which the hon. Lady referred occurred and something did happen to a family member, we know where the mud would stick: it would be on the Government who authorised the transfer.

Caroline Flint: I hope that I can help the hon. Gentleman. In considering the different circumstances under which a final decision not to transfer might be made by the Secretary of State, there could be a number of issues. One of the problems is coming up with all those examples of exceptional circumstances.
 The warrant authorises the transfer of the prisoner only; it does not require it. That is why we do not want the validity of the warrant to be affected by withdrawal of consent. We shall not transfer if the Secretary of State considers it unwise, but we do not want to withdraw the warrant and go back to the beginning of the process. If certain circumstances arose—I have mentioned a few, such as a national emergency in the country of destination or a person being unwell and unfit to travel; the hon. Member for North Down suggested another circumstance—there is an opportunity for the Secretary of State to act. We want to ensure that at the end of the process there is a safeguard, so that we do not undermine all the work that has been done preceding the warrant's authorisation.

James Paice: I am grateful to the Minister for trying to clarify the situation. There remains the fundamental point about the decision being that of the Secretary of State or somebody acting on his behalf, or that of the prisoner who wants to withdraw their consent. I envisage a situation where threats have been issued against the prisoner's family, but the Secretary of State refuses to take them seriously. That is not, by any means, unimaginable.

Lady Hermon: I can give the hon. Gentleman a concrete example. I am referring to a young man, the late Alan McCullough. He was only 21 . He was encouraged to come back to Northern Ireland by paramilitaries who assured him that he would be safe. He was taken prisoner, tortured and executed. At his
 funeral yesterday, the same group threatened his mother, sisters and partner—all women—with execution if they gave evidence in a court under any jurisdiction.

James Paice: That is a telling intervention. I am grateful to the hon. Lady, as what she says gives considerable substance to the concerns that I have expressed. It is clear that the Minister will not accede to my amendments or even to the principle, so there is little point in pushing it at this stage. Clearly, she has not yet got to the point that her predecessor reached, who used to stand up and say that he had been given a load of garbage to read out. He said words to that effect last week, which is probably why he was promoted. It is a practice that we should encourage.

Nick Hawkins: Given that the previous Minister said that, it strikes me as extremely appropriate that he went back to the Whips Office.

James Paice: Yes. Clearly, I cannot expect the Minister suddenly to change tact. It would be unrealistic of me to do so.

Caroline Flint: I remind the hon. Gentleman that what we are facing under the clause is exactly what we faced when discussing the 1990 Act that the Conservative party passed. Such transfers are in respect not of participating in proceedings, but of assisting UK investigations.

James Paice: I am grateful to the Minister. I was fully aware of what she meant. We have mentioned the 1990 Act when discussing almost every group of amendments since we started proceedings a week ago. It seems that, when the Government do not want to change the Bill, they say, ''Well, this was in the 1990 Act'', and then they change that Act in other areas because they believe that it needs changing. The Minister's predecessor paraded that odd argument last week. I hope that it will be the last time that we hear it while she is responsible for the Bill.

Caroline Flint: Don't hold your breath.

James Paice: Well, perhaps the message will get through to those who write Ministers' briefs that such an argument is pointless. We all accept that, after 13 years, legislation needs to be re-examined. If the 1990 Act were perfect, most of the Bill would not be before us. It has had to be drafted because of the need to change provisions to meet the new conventions that we have signed up to during the intervening period.
 I shall not pursue the issue now. With utmost respect for the arguments advanced by the Minister, I hope that she will understand the worry that is felt about such matters. The hon. Member for North Down has described particular circumstances that add immense substance to our argument. We may wish to return to it later in our proceedings, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 48 to 51 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New clause 4 - Persons under 18 years of age

'The Secretary of State may by order provide that the provisions of this Part shall apply with modifications in respect of persons under 18 years of age to take into account the needs of such persons.'.—[Mr. Paice.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

James Paice: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
 The new clause has been touched on. I shall come clean at the beginning of the debate. We have been upbraided in Committee several times for rehashing arguments that have been advanced in another place. However, such a debate needs to be held in Committee. The other place literally spent only a few minutes discussing the impact of the Bill on young people. The Minister may suggest that it will not apply in many cases but, when considering proposed legislation, we must reflect on what might happen, not what we think will happen. 
 Given overseas processes, the hearing of witnesses on television and by telephone and the transfer of prisoners, which we have just debated, I argue strongly that the Bill could affect people under 18 years of age. As responsible hon. Members, we must all recognise that people under the age of 18—and those who may be significantly so—have specific needs that must be addressed. They cannot necessarily be treated in the same way as an adult. As an aside, I emphasise the point on legal advice that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome made earlier, and on which he rightly forced a Division. That is even more important for young people. 
 There are also issues about the role of parents or guardians. Should they be present in all the circumstances that we have discussed in the many clauses that make up part 1? Should they have any role in the decision-making process, including, for example, the one that we have just debated on giving consent to being transferred abroad? 
 There is an issue about whether delivering by post to somebody who is not yet an adult is right. There is an alternative point, which is the reverse of what I have just said. If an individual is being charged with something that took place overseas, what happens if they would be tried in a youth court in this country but the overseas authority does not have facilities for youth courts? Would we necessarily be happy with them being tried in an adult court? There are implications with regard to human rights legislation, which must also be taken into account. Clause 30(5) requires an oath to be given. If a person gives an oath, they are opening themselves up to the accusation of perjury if they break it. 
 I give these examples because all of them illustrate why special measures must be put in place for young people. I am not suggesting that young people should be exempt from the provisions of part 1 because most young people should accept the responsibilities that one naturally gains as one grows up. However, provisions should be made for special arrangements. The purpose of new clause 4 is open and straightforward. It simply states that the Secretary of 
 State may make orders for the part of the Bill to apply with some modification. That modification could be simple. It might state that, where the individual concerned is under 18, their parent or guardian must be present at all times. 
 However, I am not trying to write the provisions. What I am saying is that the Bill should include recognition of the special arrangements that are necessary for young people. In light of that, I hope that the Minister will understand the import of the new clause. She might not like the words of the new clause, and I am not wedded to them, but I want her to recognise that it is a serious issue. The Committee has considered a substantial range of legal measures, many of which break new ground and could affect young people, and we have to recognise that special arrangements need to be made for them. 
 I hope that the Minister will respond positively to my new clause.

Caroline Flint: The hon. Gentleman raises a valid point about how we should recognise the needs of child witnesses in our court procedures. This Government do recognise that. The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 defines child witnesses as people under 17, rather than under 18—although, for automatic reporting restrictions, it sets the upper age limit at 18. That legislation recognised that due regard should be given to the needs of children appearing in legal proceedings under a number of different circumstances. That is why the new clause is unnecessary.
 Witnesses under 17 are treated differently from older witnesses in so far as they are automatically deemed under section 16 of the 1999 Act to have the status of vulnerable witnesses. As vulnerable witnesses, they are eligible, at the court's discretion, to receive any of a range of special measures—for example, screens, removal of wigs and gowns, giving evidence in private, via video recording or live link—that are designed to help such witnesses to give their best evidence. Whether any such measures are applied is up to the court in the particular case, but it must have regard to whether any of the measures, alone or combined, would be likely to improve the quality of the witness's evidence and to protect the needs of the child as defined. 
 There are additional safeguards in cases involving sexual offences, violence—including threats—and cruelty, in which under–17s have the status of child witnesses in need of special protection. Giving evidence by live link and/or video recording is virtually mandatory in such cases. The 1999 Act applies to all criminal proceedings in England and Wales. In Scotland, the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 makes provision for similar safeguards in cases involving under–16s, including the use of screens and closed circuit television. 
 If an overseas authority requested evidence on oath from a child witness here, the court would be required to take account of the legislation. Similarly, an authority requesting assistance from overseas from a child witness for use in domestic proceedings would 
 have to take into account the provisions of the legislation. There is no need for provision in the Bill to make special arrangements for the treatment of child witnesses, as that is governed by existing primary legislation. 
 In relation to the transfer of prisoners under chapter 5, there is no absolute bar on the transfer of prisoners under the age of 18. Under the terms of sections 5 and 6 of the 1990 Act, any person serving a sentence in a prison or other institution to which the Prison Act 1952 or the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989 applies may be transferred. That includes those under 18. In such cases, a parent or guardian may give or refuse consent on behalf of a prisoner if, on account of their age, they cannot make the decision. That is the same as the situation with all prisoners. Consent must be given for transfer. 
 To sum up, the new clause is unnecessary. We understand the reasons why it was tabled, and it was important to have the debate, but child witnesses are already adequately protected under primary legislation. It is hoped that cases involving child witnesses will be extremely unusual, but protection does exist for such a situation.

James Paice: I am grateful to the Minister and congratulate her on a far more comprehensive response to the issue than Lord Bassam gave when it was debated in the other place. His response was scanty, to say the least. I also note that the hon. Lady did not fall back on the excuse that Lord Bassam gave at the time, which was to say that the matter was addressed in the 1990 Act, so it should not be changed. Perhaps my earlier ammunition has already borne fruit, but we will wait and see before we take that as read.
 The Minister advances a cogent argument that the point is already covered in other legislation—I shall forget the 1990 Act for a moment—and I am grateful for her recognition that there is an issue that has to be addressed. The Government believe that it is addressed. I will not dispute that now. I will have to study what the hon. Lady said, so that I can be reassured that the point is covered, but the Government seem to understand now, even if they did not when the issue was debated in the other place, the importance of what we suggest. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. 
 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New clause 5 - Annual report on effects of requests for banking information

'(1) The Secretary of State shall publish each year a report on the effects of requests for banking information introduced under this Act. 
 (2) In each report under subsection (1) the Secretary of State shall include— 
 (a) a cost assessment of complying with a request for information, 
 (b) the frequency of requests from participating countries, and 
 (c) the time taken to comply with requests.'.—[Mr. Hawkins.] 
Brought up, and read the First time.

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
 I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Benton. We are now coming to a couple of new clauses that relate to the banking aspect of the Bill that we debated this morning, when your colleague, Mr. Hurst, was in the Chair. The Minister and the rest of the Committee may have noticed that the important issue of an annual report was debated not once but twice in another place—on 27 January and 25 February. Conservative Members feel strongly about the issue, as does the British Bankers Association. It has pressed us to continue to pursue the matter, and I am certainly happy to do so. For the reasons that I set out this morning and which my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster (Mr. Wiggin), who is unable to be with us this afternoon, reinforced, grave concern is felt by the banking community that the new provisions may turn out to be somewhat onerous. As my noble Friend Viscount Bridgeman, said in another place, we need to have an annual report to set out exactly what the costs will be and how matters will operate. 
 In another place on 27 January, Lord Filkin gave only a brief response to the worries expressed by my noble Friend Viscount Bridgeman, which were echoed by my noble Friend Lord Renton, and Lord Monson. Lord Bassam of Brighton gave a slightly longer response on the second occasion. I wish to refer to one or two points that were made in another place.

Stephen Hesford: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Nick Hawkins: In a moment, but before I do so, I want to stress what Lord Monson said. When making reference to my noble Friend Lord Renton, he said:
''we are in uncharted waters. Parliamentarians and the public have a right to know the cost to the taxpayer of complying with the requests and to know how often such requests are made.''
 Lord Monson forcefully made the point that it is not a matter of probing or calling for an annual report for the sake of it. Lord Renton said: 
''The Bill breaks new ground internationally and will affect people's rights all over the world—potentially, at any rate. We should know, from time to time, what progress has been made in implementing it.
The new clause merely asks for details of the effects of requests for banking information. That is not a big demand, but it is important, and I would have hoped that the Government would be sympathetic.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 27 January 2003; Vol. 643, c. GC142.]
 Such a statement encapsulates our case in a nutshell.

Stephen Hesford: The new clause does not deal with the effective administration of justice, which is what the Bill is about. It is nit-picking about cost. What price do we put on the effective administration of justice and co-operation across jurisdictions in dealing with such issues, some of which are serious to my constituents and others?

Nick Hawkins: If the hon. Gentleman wants to add to the annual report and wants a specific report on the effects on the administration of justice, I am sure that we would have no objection to that. However, I take issue with his saying that we are nit-picking. I am sure that the Minister will not say that when she responds. A responsible and serious organisation, such as the
 BBA, said that it wants such a report because it would evaluate how much the banking provisions of the Bill are used and review the unit costs of handling individual cases and the number of inquiries received by the UK under the protocol. Its worries, which we echo, are not to be dismissed at nit-picking. The matter is important. It is not something that can be dismissed.
 Indeed, from the Government's Front Bench in another place, Lord Bassam of Brighton said: 
''I shall not level my common allegation that when stuck for an amendment one dreams up an annual report to demand.
I see the point made by the noble Lord.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 25 February 2003; Vol. 645, c. GC218.]
 He was responding to my noble Friend Viscount Bridgeman. The Government Front Bench in another place certainly took the matter seriously. I hope that that will show the hon. Member for Wirral, West (Stephen Hesford) that he was wrong to level at us an allegation of nit-picking. We are making a serious request, and I hope that the Minister will treat it equally seriously.

Caroline Flint: Clearly, it is important that there is access to information about how the new powers under the Bill are proceeding. I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that there are different ways and means of achieving that end. As with the similar proposal in connection with freezing orders, we do not see a need for a statutory requirement for a report on the operation and the costs involved in executing requests for banking information. I understand that hon. Members were concerned that there are relatively few statistics available relating to the operation of the 1990 Act. Fortunately, technology has moved on since that Act was passed, which will make it easier to keep such statistics in future.
 The Home Office keeps records and statistics on the number of requests received by and sent from the UK. Furthermore, we explicitly require all requests made on the strength of a protocol to be sent via the territorial authority for the specific purpose of monitoring the frequency and success of such requests. In that way, we will be able to identify and deal with any problems if they arise. We believe that it will be possible to obtain information on the working of the new arrangements by tabling parliamentary questions, and that that is an adequate way in which to get information of that nature into the public domain, without a statutory obligation to produce an annual report. 
 Furthermore, although requests to identify monitored bank accounts are new, the UK already receives and responds to other types of requests for banking information. Requests to provide copies of bank statements and other records relating to identified accounts are numerous and routine. 
 As was said earlier in the debate, we will be monitoring the effectiveness of all the new provisions in the Bill, and I am sure that we will still be in contact with representatives of the banking industry, to ensure 
 that the provisions of the Bill are not unduly onerous in achieving the task that we are discussing.

Nick Hawkins: I am rather disappointed with the Minister's response. I remind her that the Government's estimate of the cost to the banking industry of complying with the legislation—the Government's own regulatory impact assessment—puts the cost at between £1.26 million and £3.7 million a year. As was said in another place, it is essential that there is transparency in the matter. Although the BBA supports the measure, we must ensure that the procedure is working, and that there is proper co-operation between member states. Viscount Bridgeman quoted the BBA as follows:
''The UK, and the information which the UK will, potentially, be able to obtain will not be less or less timely than that which the UK will normally provide. Differences could arise through, for example, different legal procedures or bank secrecy rules, in particular where the retail banking structure is less concentrated than in the UK. Such differences could reduce the benefits for more ready access to information in response to requests for mutual legal assistance.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 25 February 2003; Vol. 645, c. 218.]
 As my noble Friend Viscount Bridgeman said in another place: 
''An annual report will help to establish the extent to which there is a level playing field both in theory and in practice.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 25 February 2003; Vol. 645, c. 218.]
 It will also establish whether there is a level playing field. That links in to the points that I made before lunch. We are not satisfied with the Government's response, and therefore I wish to divide the Committee on the matter. 
 Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived. New Clause 6Commencement of Chapter 4

New Clause 6 - Commencement of Chapter 4

'Nothing in this Chapter shall come into effect until such a time as all participating countries have implemented similar provisions.'.—[Mr. Hawkins.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
 We can deal with this matter rather more briefly. The new clause repeats a point that we made before lunch—that none of the provisions in the chapter should come into force until it is apparent that the other countries have introduced reciprocal provisions, and those provisions are in force. I do not want to take up too much of the Committee's time, but we thought that it would be helpful to have that in the Bill. That is 
 what we look forward to, and I shall listen with interest to what the Minister has to say.

Caroline Flint: As the hon. Gentleman says, the subject is similar to one that we discussed earlier today. The new clause would ensure that the provisions of chapter 4 did not come into effect until all participating countries had implemented similar provisions. That is similar ground to that covered in discussion on amendment No. 88A, which sought to restrict the application of clause 32 to EU member states that had incorporated similar provisions into national law.
 We think that the new clause is unnecessary. Participating countries, for the purpose of chapter 4, will be member states of the European Union, and it is inevitable that they will implement the protocol at different times. Indeed, the protocol is framed in such a way as to ensure that the failure of just one or two states to adopt the protocol does not prevent the agreement from coming into force between the other parties. The protocol provides that it will enter into force once eight member states have ratified. 
 We would not wish to restrict the application of our legislative provisions until the last member state ratifies. That would not be of any benefit to us, and would prevent our authorities from seeking assistance from countries that could assist. However, I stress that that does not mean that we will be responding to requests for customer information and account monitoring from those member states that have not adopted the protocol. In order to make a request on the basis of articles 1, 2 or 3 of the protocol, member states must have notified the Council of the EU under the terms of article 13.

Nick Hawkins: I want some helpful clarification, if the Minister can give it. If she cannot, I will accept her undertaking to write to me and the other members of the Committee on the matter. She talked about restrictions on agreements coming into force when eight member countries had ratified. Does ''ratification'' mean just that, or does it mean implementation, so that the laws in those eight member states would come into force and operate?

Caroline Flint: To finish the point I was making, before I come to the hon. Gentleman's point, there is no question of states that have not adopted the protocol being able to make requests on the strength of it.
 I will seek guidance on the hon. Gentleman's question, and will write to him in due course. I am trying to be helpful in saying that the protocol has to be ratified by different EU member states, but they may not all do so at the same time. We would not want a situation in which we wanted to investigate a certain matter and required disclosure of information, but could not do that with a member state that had already ratified the protocol. That is my understanding of the situation. For clarification, ''ratification'' means that the country has to be ready and able to assist. I hope that that is helpful.

Nick Hawkins: It is indeed. The Minister received guidance quickly and put it on the record. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 52 - Jurisdiction for terrorist offfences

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 66, in
clause 52, page 32, line 15, at end insert— 
 '(i) aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of, or attempting or conspiring to commit, any of the offences in paragraphs (a) to (h)'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 67, in
clause 52, page 32, line 35, at end insert— 
 '(e) aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of, or attempting to commit, any of the offences in paragraphs (a) to (d)'.

James Paice: We now move to part 2, which deals with terrorist acts and threats and the issue of jurisdiction. I should say at the outset that we welcome the provisions, notwithstanding that we are proposing a couple of probing amendments to them.
 The amendments are identical in effect. They would add the following to the list of offences in proposed new clause 63B of the Terrorism Act 2000: 
''aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of, or attempting or conspiring to commit, any of the offences in paragraphs (a) to (h)''.
 That is the list already in the Bill. I am sure that it will not be disputed that they are all serious offences, that they are all connected to terrorism or similar, and that every measure must be taken to deal with them. I hope that the Minister will confirm that these offences are covered, but my concern is that if they are not, they are not in the Bill. They are in article 4 of the framework decision, which was clearly stated in the debate in the other place. The Government have set out a list of offences beginning at the bottom of page 31 and going on to page 32. Why does that not include the offences that we have listed in our amendment? Either a list is not produced in the Bill, as it is impossible to be sure that everything is covered, or an exhaustive list is produced. Those of us who have sat through many Committees have had this debate on several occasions. To have a list that is not exhaustive seems to fall between two stools. 
 The Government have listed a range of offences, with which I do not disagree, but they do not make it clear that the offences listed in amendment No. 66 are covered, despite the fact that they are in the framework decision. We are taking extra-territorial jurisdiction over substantive offences, which in itself is a major legal step, so we need to ensure that it is clear in the legislation what is covered. My point is simply one of clarification. Why, having started on the road to list offences covered by the clause, have the Government not listed all the offences? If I am right in assuming that the offences listed in our amendment are covered, why are they not in the Bill?

David Heath: We are moving on to a new and important part of the Bill. I shall place on the record
 the view of my party that this is an important provision that we support in principle. There should be the extra-territorial jurisdiction.
 I share some of the concerns of the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire. Lists inherently are not always the best way of dealing with such matters. I presume that the list exists because the agreement under the framework directive requires offences to be specified, as opposed to the more general terms for terrorist offences required by terrorist legislation, which are defined in the Terrorism Act 2000. 
 The hon. Gentleman went on to suggest that it is necessary to provide for the additional offences of aiding, abetting, conspiring, et cetera. There is an interesting, although not illuminating, reference to that in explanatory note 119, which states: 
''Where an extra-territorial offence is created, extra-territorial jurisdiction is also automatically taken over secondary and inchoate offences, such as aiding, abetting, attempting, inciting, conspiring, counselling or procuring.''
 In other words, the explanatory notes suggest that the hon. Gentleman's concerns are already covered, but it is not clear how. We are writing British law, not a European directive, and our law usually requires matters to be spelt out. If one is creating an area of jurisdiction that deals with specific offences, we would usually expect to identify what those offences are. 
 I certainly do not have the expertise, not only in English and Welsh law, but in Scottish and Northern Irish law, to know that in each case there is a secondary offence other than the broad ''criminal conspiracy'' and descriptions of that kind. There are specific offences in each of these instances of aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring, et cetera. If they are specific offences, it is sensible to list them. If they are not specific offences, I am unsure whether we can invent them by inference, which would appear to be the case here. 
 I ask the Minister how this list may or may not be amended in future, because there does not appear to be express provision for amendments to the list of specified offences over which we are taking jurisdiction. Usually, in a Bill of this kind, that is done by negative resolution whenever there is a new agreement in the Council of Ministers, and we have debated that. However, that does not appear to be case in this instance. Does that mean that we would need new primary legislation if there were to be any amendments to that list by agreement or otherwise? If a crime was committed for terrorist purposes that does not appear in this list, can we assume that it would not be subject to the extra-territorial jurisdiction? I presume that that is the case and that, despite the fact that that has formed part of a criminal act that was linked to terrorism, we cannot assume that we would have such jurisdiction in those circumstances? Does the Minister believe that the definition is watertight in all contexts? If a new law were to be made by a constituent part of the United Kingdom, how would that be incorporated within this provision in the Bill? 
 There are a series of interlocking questions, the answers to which are important to our understanding of this part of the Bill, and I should be grateful if the Minister would give us an extensive reply so that we can be clear about what we are talking about.

Caroline Flint: The discussion has been useful. As the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire pointed out, these are probing amendments, and I hope that my explanations on the points that have been raised will clarify matters and reassure him.
 We have taken full account of the requirements of article 4 of the framework decision on combating terrorism, which these clauses implement. The hon. Gentleman referred to paragraph 119 of the explanatory notes, which states: 
''Where an extra-territorial offence is created, extra-territorial jurisdiction is also automatically taken over secondary and inchoate offences''.
 Article 4 of the framework decision on combating terrorism requires member states to ensure that inciting, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit an offence referred to in articles 1, 2 or 3 of the framework decision is made punishable. Article 9 requires member states to take extra-territorial jurisdiction over the offences listed in article 4 in certain circumstances. 
 I hope that the next point addresses some of the hon. Gentleman's particular concerns. Under UK law, jurisdiction for 
''secondary and inchoate offences, such as aiding, abetting, attempting, inciting, conspiring, counselling or procuring''
 is dependent on whether we have taken jurisdiction for the substantive offence in the UK. As we are taking extra-territorial jurisdiction over the substantive offences listed in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the framework decision in certain circumstances, we do not need to legislate specifically in order to take extra-territorial jurisdiction over aiding, abetting, attempting, inciting, conspiring, counselling or procuring to commit the offences listed in new sections 63B and 63C of the Terrorism Act 2000, in the particular circumstances described in them. Rather, 
''Where an extra-territorial offence is created, extra territorial jurisdiction is also automatically taken over secondary and inchoate offences''.
 My understanding is that no further legislative provision is necessary to achieve that. I can provide the hon. Gentleman with other examples of legislation when extra-territorial offences are created, but no provision is made for secondary and inchoate offences, such as the Taking of Hostages Act 1982, the Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983, the United Nations Personnel Act 1997, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Chemical Weapons Act 1996.

David Heath: The hon. Lady's response has been helpful, but it begs the question of where such matters are set out in British law. The assumption is that they exist under British law. I just wonder where. There must be a statute that says that, when we take territorial jurisdiction for a substantive offence, we also take similar jurisdiction for the secondary
 offences. Obviously, the Minister has not been provided with a reference to that.

Caroline Flint: I hope shortly to provide an answer to that question. Another earlier point was how we take extra-territorial jurisdiction for, say, a new offence. If we create a new offence and wish to take extra-territorial jurisdiction for it, there would have to be a consequential amendment in the legislation. We would have to come back to it. As for the relationship between UK and international law, a rule of common law has been developed over time. We can provide further details, if required. I hope that that satisfies the hon. Gentleman.

James Paice: I am grateful to the Minister for her reply and reassurances. I thank the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome for helping me to wheedle out some of the facts from her. Obviously, it is important that such matters are covered under the Bill. I accept at face value her assertion.

Lady Hermon: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the Bill has huge potential to deal with international financing of terrorism? Is it his understanding that the Minister's explanation covered that point?

James Paice: The Minister may wish to intervene to clarify the situation. I argue that financing is covered by aiding and abetting. I am not a lawyer, however, so others may argue that it is not. If the Minister does not have time to intervene, I am sure that she will write to us and confirm whether financing is covered by the Bill. Obviously, there would be a major hole in the Bill if it were not covered. I shall assume that it is. However long I prevaricate, it seems that the Minister will not respond. I shall happily give way to her.

Caroline Flint: The example cited by the hon. Gentleman of aiding and abetting would apply to the financing of terrorism. I am happy to receive further details about the matter to make sure that the hon. Member for North Down is reassured.

James Paice: I am grateful to the Minister. On the strength of her answer, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 68, in
clause 52, page 32, line 38, after 'of', insert 'or employed by'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 69, in
clause 52, page 32, line 43, after 'of', insert 'or employed by'.

James Paice: I wish to clarify the exceptions under clause 52 and whether ''members of'' a United Kingdom diplomatic mission covers all employees, including locally recruited people. That is the simple question behind the amendment. I am sure that all our embassies and diplomatic missions recruit locally, and once those people are part and parcel of the establishment, they deserve the protection provided by the new section. We know what being a Member of this place involves, but it is unclear whether being a ''member of'' a diplomatic mission includes employees.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman is making an extremely important point. Locally recruited staff who
 are not part of the mission but serve within it would have no diplomatic status and would therefore need the protection of the new section, especially as they are perhaps the most likely to be injured by any terrorist attack on premises owned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

James Paice: The hon. Gentleman is right. If, God forbid, there was a terrorist attack on one of our missions abroad, it would be wholly unjust if the protection given to members was different from that given to those who were not members but in the same room when the attack took place. I am trying to ensure only that the term ''member of'' includes locally recruited employees. It is a straightforward but important point.

Caroline Flint: It is helpful that the hon. Gentleman raised the issue so that we can clarify on the record which people working in our missions overseas will be protected.
 New section 63C(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 gives the United Kingdom extra-territorial jurisdiction over certain domestic offences when they are committed against UK nationals, residents or ''protected persons'' outside the UK as an act of terrorism or for the purposes of terrorism. Subsection (3) specifies those persons who are ''protected persons'', which includes, inter alia, a member of a UK diplomatic mission within the meaning of article 1(b) of the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations 1961, as given effect in the UK by section 2 and schedule 1 of the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. It also includes a member of a UK consular post within the meaning of article 1(g) of the Vienna convention on consular relations 1963, as given effect in the UK by section 1 and schedule 1 to the Consular Relations Act 1968. 
 I want to make it clear that the definitions of ''member'' of a diplomatic mission and consular post outlined in those Acts include the employees of the mission and consular post, as the definition includes diplomatic, technical, administrative and service staff of the mission. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentlemen that employees are already covered within the meaning of ''members''.

James Paice: To double check, does that include locally recruited nationals of the foreign country?

Caroline Flint: Yes, I am pleased to confirm that that does include locally recruited people. They contribute greatly to our services overseas, and we would expect them to be protected in the legislation.

James Paice: I am grateful to the Minister for her clarification. She has put on record what I wanted to hear. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: I want to ask just a couple of questions on the operation of the clause.
 In the clause, the provisions for United Kingdom nationals are extended to nationals of the overseas territories and British overseas citizens. When would a person who has committed what would have been an 
 offence in the UK face prosecution as a British overseas national or overseas territory citizen in the courts of the UK rather than in the courts of that territory? That may be an unanswerable question, and the provision may exist simply to allow for all circumstances to be taken into account. However, is similar legislation envisaged in the British overseas territories to allow them extra-territorial jurisdiction over their own citizens so that a national of the Turks and Caicos Islands—therefore a British overseas territory citizen—could be tried in the Turks and Caicos Islands, Gibraltar or wherever? 
 If an offence is committed overseas that would be an offence in any part of the United Kingdom, what would direct that a case would be heard and an indictment made and under what jurisdiction? Would it be at the direction of the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Lord Advocate or Scottish Ministers? In what circumstances would a case be tried in a Scottish court rather than an English or Welsh court for an offence that had not taken place in Scotland, England or Wales, and where the citizen involved was not resident in Scotland, England or Wales? 
 At the bottom of page 32, there is a curious distinction for the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, for which the explanation in the explanatory notes is that this is the only body of its kind based in the UK. We should be upset about that, if that is the case. It seems odd that the agency should be singled out in the legislation. It may be only temporarily the only EU body in the UK. Other bodies may come later, or it may move. 
 This part of the Bill deals with attacks abroad on UK nationals, residents and diplomatic staff, and is trying to identify those people who are protected persons. It is therefore odd that the definition of protected persons gives an agency that is situated in the UK, not abroad, as its only specific reference to international bodies. I would have expected a list or a schedule of more international bodies to be provided, and for the more important bodies to be in countries overseas where we would wish to assume jurisdiction, rather than for an agency to be in this country where we must assume that we already have jurisdiction. I am sure that there is a good reason for this, but it does not come to mind at the moment.

Caroline Flint: Just when one thinks that it is safe . . . There are no plans for similar legislation in overseas territories. That would be a matter for them. In an earlier discussion today, I said that we would provide a note on how the Bill will affect overseas territories. Gibraltar was mentioned.
 The hon. Gentleman also asked which state would prosecute. If the offence was committed abroad, the question of where the defendant is tried in the UK would depend on whether the suspect was arrested in the UK and, if so, in which part. The second main factor is which prosecuting authority in the UK sought extradition of the suspect if he was arrested abroad. If the English Crown Prosecution Service sought extradition, it would probably be in England. In 
 such cases where there may be competing claims from the states involved relating to who will prosecute the subject, the extradition arrangements between states will be used to decide which jurisdiction will prosecute the suspect. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman's question. 
 I will write to the hon. Gentleman about his final point in due course. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 54 - Application of section 55

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 70, in
clause 54, page 36, line 4, leave out 'in prescribed circumstances' and insert 
 'where a member state other than the United Kingdom has declared that it will apply discretionary conditions to the recognition of disqualifications, as described in Article 6(2) of the Convention on Driving Disqualifications 1998'.
 In passing, I commend the Minister on the way in which she has fulfilled her responsibilities on her first day in this Committee. I also welcome the latest addition to our discussions, the Under-Secretary of State for Transport. He is here in name but he has not been present in person for most of the proceedings so far. I welcome the Minister, who will handle the chapter dealing with driving disqualifications. 
 Amendment No. 70 is a probing amendment, as so many of the amendments are. It would amend subsection (4), which says 
''Section 55 does not apply in prescribed circumstances.''
 Later, we are told that ''prescribed circumstances'' basically means whatever a Minister says. I want to hear from the Minister what is really meant by the term. We are seeking to remove ''prescribed circumstances'' and instead say that clause 55 should not apply 
''where a member state other than the United Kingdom has declared that it will apply discretionary conditions to the recognition of disqualifications''
 in the convention. It is perfectly clear what we mean by that. Obviously, if another country has decided not to apply the convention in total, but will apply discretionary conditions from the convention, that should be reflected in how we deal with that country. It is quite clear that clause 55 should not apply in those circumstances. 
 There may well be other circumstances in which clause 55 should not apply that I cannot think of at present. I shall not pretend to the Minister that I am unduly wedded to the insertion that the amendment would make, although I think that it is important, and the situation that I mentioned certainly needs to be a prescribed circumstance. I want to know what other circumstances the Minister thinks could be prescribed, apart from his jocular agreement that they are anything that a Minister thinks they should be. It is important to put on record the sort of circumstances in which the Minister envisages clause 55 not applying.

David Heath: I agree with the hon. Gentleman. Subsection (4) is the sort of provision that brings Government into disrepute. The provision should not be framed in that way; it must be more specific. I hope that the Minister can give us the full range of circumstances in which he would expect the provision to apply, and the terms under which it would be prescribed.

David Jamieson: It is a pleasure to appear in Committee before you this afternoon, Mr. Benton. It has also been a pleasure to listen to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley, on her first outing in her new job. I seem to have survived eviction from the ''Big Brother'' household for another year, but I dare say that I might be nominated on another occasion.
 Clause 54 describes when the duty to notify a driver's state of residence would apply, so that a disqualification imposed in the United Kingdom on a resident of another member state could be enforced under the EU convention. Clause 54(4) allows regulations to specify when the requirement to notify will not apply. That is necessary because article 6 of the convention allows member states to declare that they will always refuse to enforce a disqualification where the conduct does not constitute an offence in that state, where the driving disqualification would not be a measure available in that state for the conduct involved, or if the remaining period of disqualification is less than one month. 
 Regulations are required to detail the exact terms of the declaration made by the state concerned. The EU convention allows a member state—this is the important point for the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome—to declare that it will always apply the conditions in article 6(2) 
''in part or in full''.
 It may also withdraw from its declaration at any time. 
 The amendment is too broad. It would not discriminate in its application according to the terms of the declaration made by each state. That is why we need regulations—to take into consideration the different circumstances of individual states or changes in circumstances, which may occur from time to time. That is the reason for the provisions in the clause that we are discussing. 
 We do not know at this stage how many member states will make a declaration in respect of article 6(2). That will become clear only as and when other member states ratify the convention. We intend to seek agreements with those member states to allow us to implement the convention on a bilateral basis in advance of full implementation. Given the changing circumstances and considerable amount of flux, the part of the clause that we are discussing is required. I can assure the hon. Members for South-East Cambridgeshire and for Somerton and Frome that the Government have no ulterior motive in inserting the clause into the Bill.

James Paice: The Minister said what I suspected he would say—that everything would be done in regulations—but he added a little more, particularly
 about our not yet knowing which countries will apply discretionary conditions to the convention. That seems a fairly reasonable response, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nick Hawkins: I shall not detain the Committee long. I, too, welcome the Minister who is responding to this aspect of the Bill. He will have noticed that Opposition Members tabled a new clause to deal with disqualified drivers and their insurance, which is of interest in the media and the country as a whole, but sadly it was not selected. I applied my ingenuity as carefully as I could, with the enormous help of the Clerk to the Committee. The Clerks are always tremendously helpful, but whatever ingenuity I was able to summon up, I could not draft the new clause in such a way that it was selectable. However, it appeared on the amendment paper, so no doubt the Minister had an opportunity at some stage to look at it briefly in case it was selected.
 I simply want to state on the record before we vote in the Chamber that whether we are talking about drivers from overseas, to which the main purpose of this part of the Bill relates, or UK drivers, there is great concern in the country about what might happen if someone is convicted of the offence of not having insurance, because it is understood that the Government might be contemplating a change in the arrangements for sentences. The concern is that the sentence for not having insurance, particularly for young drivers, will, according to guidance from the sentencing council, be a fine lower than the cost of insurance. In that case, given how those in their late teens, who are new drivers, tend to think, there will no incentive for them to get insurance policies. 
 Having children and stepchildren in their late teens, I know that it is very expensive for new drivers to get insurance. It quite often costs more than £1,000. It was recently suggested that the Government might be contemplating saying to magistrates courts that the sentences for such offences would only be of the order of fines of £200. If we move in that direction—I certainly urge the Government not to do so—an awful lot of young drivers will say that it is much cheaper to pay the fines. I see the Parliamentary Private Secretary, the hon. Member for Brent, North (Mr. Gardiner), nodding. He understands what I am saying, because he has a child of a similar age to one of mine. We need to fire a warning shot across the Government's bows, even though I did not succeed in drafting a new clause to deal with the matter. 
 I am sure that the Minister is listening to what I have to say. I hope that, even though he may not be able to respond in great detail now, he will report back to his fellow Ministers, and that the Home Office and the Department for Transport will ensure that we do not go down that road. There are too many young uninsured drivers on the roads. I see the Minister nodding. We do not want that situation to get worse, so I hope that the rumours that the sentences, the guidance to magistrates and even the law might change 
 will prove unfounded or, if there is such a plan, that the Government will have second thoughts.

David Heath: It was rather discourteous of me not to welcome the hon. Gentleman during my last contribution. I shall put that right now, although I feel that he was with us at least in spirit.
 I confess that this part of the Bill, for me, is the most opaque. I have little experience of traffic offences, and I find it difficult to understand some of the provisions. However, I am sure that the Minister can help me in two respects. First, can he confirm my understanding that the whole clause deals only with road traffic offences that are genuinely road traffic offences—in other words, that disqualification from driving was the result of having committed an offence in a motor car, and not for reasons unrelated to traffic offences? I think that he will tell me that I am right. Secondly, is there anything in the clause that allows for transfer of information about partial disqualifications or endorsements of driving licences that fall short of full disqualification? 
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

David Jamieson: I thought that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath was rather clever—I have never said it before—by speaking to an amendment that had not been called. At one stage, he said that my hon. Friend the Member for Brent, North was nodding in approval, but he told me that he was nodding off.
 It is true that there is a fixed penalty of £200 plus six penalty points for having no insurance. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath knows that if a case goes to court under section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a fine of up to £5,000 and between six and eight penalty points can be imposed and it can result in discretionary disqualification. If someone receives a fixed penalty and is caught again a few days later, he will receive another fixed penalty, although repeat offenders are likely to be taken to court.

Nick Hawkins: I am grateful for the Minister's congratulating me on my ingenuity. I think that I ought to defend the character and reputation of the Parliamentary Private Secretary. He was not nodding off. Despite the badinage, I know the difference between someone nodding off and someone nodding in agreement.
 The Minister understands our concern about the fixed penalty. Our argument is that all cases should continue to be heard in court. They always were when I was prosecuting or defending cases at the Bar. I hope that the Minister will deal with the issue seriously—he has already started—and will reflect on the points that I raised, which have received extensive media coverage.

David Jamieson: This is probably not the place for such a debate, but some important points have been raised. Road safety is an important part of my brief.
 That is why we are enforcing vehicle excise duty—the road tax—so vigorously; many of those who have no road tax have no insurance or MOT certificate, and they often are committing other offences. However, that is enough of that.
 The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome asked about other types of disqualification. I assure him that disqualification applies only to road traffic offences. I believe that one can be disqualified for not paying CSA payments, and one can be disqualified on medical grounds, but that would not apply in another country. 
 The hon. Gentleman then spoke about endorsements. That is a little more complex, and I wonder whether he meant penalty points. The penalty points system is different in each country—and non-existent in some. The totting-up arrangements allow the points to be totalled, and in this country, those who have 12 points are disqualified. In other words, it is only the act of disqualification that is recognised on a bilateral basis by countries, not penalty points, not least because the system varies so widely across the European Union. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 54 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 55 - Duty to give notice to foreign

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 104, in
clause 55, page 36, line 26, at end insert new subparagraph— 
 '(g) state that there is written evidence that the offender has had adequate opportunity to defend himself and to gain access to legal advice'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 106, in 
clause 55, page 36, line 32, at end insert 'written'.
 Amendment No. 107, in 
clause 56, page 37, line 20, at end insert 
 ', and 
 (e) there is written evidence that the offender has had adequate opportunity to defend himself and to gain access to legal advice'.

James Paice: Non-UK residents are most likely to be residents of the foreign authority, but that is not necessarily the case. Amendments Nos. 104 and 107 are effectively the same, and would ensure that there was written evidence that the offender had adequate opportunity to defend himself and to gain access to legal advice.
 The Minister was not here—that is understandable, and not a criticism—for some of the earlier proceedings when we debated the provisions for legal advice in the Bill. The difference in this context is that the provision concerns a non-UK resident, who might have to go back to their own country with a disqualification imposed by a British court. It is therefore important that the notice to that foreign authority should, in addition to all the other items listed in subsection (2), confirm that the individual had 
 the opportunity to gain access to legal advice and to defend himself. The amendment does not say that that person has received legal advice, but that they have had the opportunity to obtain it if they so wish. 
 Bearing it in mind that that non-UK resident may have a poor understanding of English, the issue of legal advice becomes even more important, because they must understand the implication of the action that has been taken against them in a British court. The two amendments are therefore straightforward, and I shall not detain the Committee in explaining them at length, because their purpose is self-evident. 
 Amendment No. 106 is a small amendment, and I suspect that the Minister will say that it is self-evident. It would require that, where an offender did not take part in the proceedings, a notice to a foreign authority issued under subsection (5) should be accompanied by evidence that the offender was notified—in other words, that the offender knew what was going on. We believe that it should be made clear that the evidence that the offender was notified should be in writing. It is a small, and perhaps pedantic, point, but we believe that it should be included in the Bill, so that we can be certain that things have been done properly. 
 The point behind the amendments is that, whatever happens in the UK, we are dealing with an issue that may have implications in another country and judicial system, so we need to adopt a belt-and-braces approach. We must ensure that when an individual returns to the country where the notice will be received, the system in that country is aware of all the implications of what has happened in the British judicial process. That is the purpose behind the amendments.

David Jamieson: Clauses 55 and 56 deal respectively with the duty to notify foreign authorities of driving disqualifications imposed on their nationals in the UK and the recognition of foreign disqualifications imposed on UK residents as laid down in the EU convention on driving disqualification.
 While I understand the concern reflected in the amendments to ensure that a driver subject to disqualification proceedings is treated properly and fairly, all EU member states, including the new member states, are signatories to the European convention on human rights, which guarantees the right to a fair hearing. 
 The convention allows the driver's state of residence to refuse to recognise a disqualification if it considers that the offender did not have an adequate opportunity to defend himself or herself, so that safeguard is already included. That decision should be made by the driver's state of residence, based on all the information provided by the state in which the offence was committed, or any additional information that the state of residence may request for the purpose. 
 In line with the requirements laid down in the convention, the Bill provides for the information transmitted to include either confirmation that the offender took part in the proceedings resulting in the disqualification or, if he did not participate, evidence that he was duly notified of those proceedings, and therefore had the opportunity to participate. That is 
 an important safeguard against proceedings in absentia, and will normally be sufficient to allow the authorities to reach a decision on enforcement of the disqualification. 
 Amendment No. 104 would extend the requirements for what is to be included in the notification sent to a foreign authority beyond the purely factual information required by the convention. A statement that written evidence exists of the adequacy of the opportunity afforded the driver to defend himself and to gain access to legal advice would involve a subjective assessment of the fairness of the court proceedings and, without the evidence itself being transmitted, would add nothing of value to the procedure. It would also introduce a test concerning access to legal advice, which is not provided for in the convention. 
 Amendment No. 106 would also go beyond the terms of the convention by requiring that evidence accompanying the notification, which shows that the offender was properly notified of the proceedings against him, be in written form. We would expect evidence normally to be given in written form, but the amendment is unnecessary and potentially restrictive, for example if we think about new forms of communication through electronic transmission. The convention requirement is that evidence be produced, and to go beyond that may create difficulties with recognition in other states. 
 Amendment No. 107 is along similar lines to the first amendment, and would make recognition of a foreign disqualification conditional on the existence of written evidence that the offender has had an adequate opportunity to defend himself and to gain access to legal advice. The Bill already makes recognition conditional on the offender having been duly notified of the proceedings and entitled to take part in them. That is a less subjective test than that envisaged by the amendment and recognises that the right to a fair hearing is already guaranteed by the European convention on human rights. It is certainly the case in this country—I think that it is the case in other European countries—that the decision over whether a defendant is getting a fair hearing and receiving adequate advice is a matter for the court to decide at the time that the defendant comes before it. The court will make a decision, and sometimes the case will be adjourned so that the person can find the relevant and proper legal advice. What is contained in the clause is adequate, and I shall resist the amendments.

James Paice: I find it ironic that some of the time we are tying to include in the Bill what is in the convention, then the Minister resists including something because it is not in the convention. It is somewhat perverse that we cannot understand why something is not in the Bill, despite the fact that it is in the convention, and yet the reverse argument is used against us. The amendments do not represent big issues, so I shall not detain the Committee any longer. I am grateful for the Minister's comments, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 105, in
clause 55, page 36, line 27, leave out subsection (3).

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 109, in 
clause 58, page 39, line 16, leave out subsection (3).
 Amendment No. 112, in 
clause 59, page 39, line 40, leave out subsection (8).

James Paice: The common feature of the amendments in this group is that they are trying to address what the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome referred to earlier: sloppy drafting of legislation and vagueness in meaning.
 Amendment No. 105 would leave out subsection (3), which states: 
''A notice under this section may contain such other information as the appropriate Minister considers appropriate.''
 We are back to the idea that the Minister can say anything that he feels like saying, as that subsection gives him the power to do so. Amendment No. 109 would remove a similar subsection from clause 58. That sort of catch-all provision is worrying. It is a sign that the Government have not thought through the implications of the legislation with which they are involved. They do not fully know the impact of it, or what they need to do when it is enacted. Therefore, they take such generic powers as are necessary to enable them to do whatever they like afterwards. The next group of amendments is similar, although I shall not trespass on those. It is all part of the same problem. The Government do not seem to understand fully the implications of their proposed legislation. Therefore, they take powers to deal with whatever may arise. 
 Clause 55(3) says: 
''A notice under this section may contain such other information as the appropriate Minister considers appropriate.''
 Apart from being dreadful grammar—two appropriates in four words—it is meaningless. The Minister ought to tell the Committee what the Government consider might be appropriate. We should bear in mind his criticism of my earlier amendment, in which I proposed a subjective statement, whereas all he wanted to put in the notice was facts; there is obviously a limit to how many facts there are. Yet he is trying to say that he will put in anything else he wants to include. Such things may, of course, be subjective, not facts. Having resisted an amendment because it is not factual, but subjective, he then takes a power that would allow him to put a subjective addition in the notice. That is extremely odd. The Minister must explain it. 
 I shall read clause 59(8) to the Committee—it is even more vague and it defies belief. 
''The notice must . . . (a) be sent in such a manner and to such address, and . . . (b) contain such particulars, as the appropriate Minister may determine.''
 I am fortunate to have been a Member of Parliament for a number of years. I have seen some pretty poor drafting under all Governments, but this comes fairly 
 high up the list. It is totally meaningless. It is the same problem as the one that I have referred to in the other amendments. Whatever the Minister decides to put in the notice, he can include; whatever he decides not to put in the notice, he may not include. In fact, subsection (8) is to do with sending the notice, not even what is included in it. There is extreme vagueness in this sloppy drafting—it is meaningless. 
 The Government ought to know what are the implications of what they include in Bills. The Minister must do a better job than the Bill does of defining, in the three different areas dealt with in the amendments, what the Government expect a Minister to do on notices and their content.

David Jamieson: Perhaps I can be allowed to smooth the ruffled brow of the hon. Gentleman, who is clearly worried. He says that he sometimes finds Bills confusing. If it is any assistance to him, I always find them confusing.
 The amendments would have an unduly restrictive effect on the content of notices given under clauses 55, 58 and 59. Amendment No. 105 would restrict the content of the notice of a disqualification given to another member state to only those details specified in clause 55(2) and no other information. That would impede the effective operation of the notification procedures by preventing the UK from including additional information that might assist the driver's state of residence in executing the disqualification. That might include information relating to the court proceedings, or to the period of disqualification already served in the UK, which the driver's state of residence must take into account, or information about any condition placed on disqualification, such as reducing the period of disqualification for attending courses for drink drivers. 
 That could also include extra information, as yet unforeseen, that would be important in executing the disqualification in the other country. I hope that that helps the hon. Gentleman.

Lady Hermon: I apologise to you, Mr. Benton, and to Committee members for being an hour late for this sitting. I was speaking to my right hon. Friend the Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) about our Ulster Unionist council meeting on the ramifications last night, so I am delighted to be here.
 The Minister has just given us a list of additional information, which he thinks that the court should have. Is that list in the convention on driving disqualifications?

David Jamieson: Yes, they are specified, as is the case in clause 55(2). What we are saying is that these parts of these clauses give the ability to provide additional information where that is appropriate.

Lady Hermon: I am grateful to the Minister for confirming that because clause 55(9) states:
''The appropriate Minister must provide—
(a) the central authority, or
(b) the competent authority of the State mentioned in subsection (1),
with any further information which it requires for the purposes of the convention on driving disqualifications.''
 That Minister has an obligation to do that. This is already covered, so I do not understand why the Minister has just made the point that these additional matters should be listed.

David Jamieson: This part of the clause gives the ability to do that. Member states may also have particular information requirements in order to give effect to disqualifications. Those will only become apparent in the course of the concluding agreement—the bilateral implementation of the convention—and we have to take that into consideration as well.
 The hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire asked whether it is catch-all or not thought through, not knowing what is coming up. To some extent that is true, because we do not know what is going to be in those bilateral agreements. We could need that flexibility for arrangements that might arise. Flexibility for a changing circumstance is what we need to consider. 
 Amendment No. 109 concerns the notice given to a driver resident in the United Kingdom that a foreign disqualification is to be recognised here: it would restrict the content of that notice to those details specified in clause 58(1). That would be unduly restrictive in that it would prevent the appropriate Minister from including additional information, as he considers that to be appropriate, in a notice of disqualification sent to a UK resident disqualified abroad. Additional information would be included in the notice only where it is relevant to the offender in respect of the disqualification imposed on him. For example, the offender may be required to surrender his licence, if it was not seized by the state where the offence took place, and information on how to reapply for a licence might also be usefully included. 
 Amendment No. 112 could lead to inconsistencies in the information provided by courts in notifying the appropriate Minister of a successful appeal against disqualification. That would cause difficulties in updating the information held by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency here and Driver and Vehicle Licensing Northern Ireland in respect of disqualified drivers. Under current procedures, courts use a format provided by the DVLA, which acts on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport, for notifying the details of the successful appeal. The DVLA provides the court with a detailed instruction booklet covering those issues. It is important to the courts and the DVLA that the notification should have a consistent form and content and be determined centrally, so that the process works efficiently.

James Paice: Methinks the Minister protests too much sometimes. [Interruption.] I protest at the vagueness and sloppiness of the drafting and the fact that the Government do not have full cognisance of the implications of what they are doing. They want what the Minister interestingly refers to as flexibility—in other words, the powers that are here for Ministers to do what they want.
 It is a worrying trend in legislation that this power is increasingly being taken. It has been around for a long while but every piece of legislation that I look at increases its usage—Ministers take powers to make 
 whatever decisions they may think fit if the Bill does not seem to work. This is an important point, and I intend to reflect on it and to study what the Minister has said when we read the record of these proceedings. We might need to pursue the matter at a later date. At this stage, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 55 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 56 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57 - Recognition in United Kingdom of

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 108, in
clause 57, page 38, line 43, leave out subsection (7).

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 111, in 
clause 59, page 39, line 32, leave out subsection (4).
 Amendment No. 113, in 
clause 63, page 41, line 26, leave out subsection (2).

James Paice: The amendments all address the issue of the Minister taking powers to change things when the Bill does not work out as expected. In all three cases, the Government specify the relevant period for providing information as 21 days, but then take the power, in this case in subsection (7), that
''The appropriate Minister may make regulations substituting a longer period for the period for the time being mentioned'',
 that is, 21 days. I notice that by no means are the Government taking powers to shorten the period, only to lengthen it. That implies that they recognise that 21 days might not be enough. 
 There are two issues. First, how did the Government arrive at 21 days and secondly, why do they not think that it is sufficient? All that is required is for a notice to be compiled and dispatched within 21 days. Most hon. Members are probably familiar with the fact that in some cases it takes Government Departments more like 21 weeks to answer letters from MPs, so it is understandable that they might consider 21 days to be too short a time in which to do anything. However, most people would consider that to be a reasonable time in which to issue a piece of correspondence, which is all that we are talking about when it comes to passing over information about driving qualifications. The point is simple but important. Why have the Government chosen 21 days? Unless it resulted from a complete wet-finger, blowing in the wind exercise, they must have given some thought to the period, but in case it turns out to be wrong, they have taken another power to change—but only to lengthen—it. If it turns out that 10 days is long enough, never mind, they will leave the law as 21 days, but if it is not possible, it can be 28 or 50 or any other number of days. 
 It is all part of the worrying trend that I have identified previously. The Government are not prepared to commit themselves to meeting particular objectives. Their target-setting agenda is in chaos; we 
 learned only yesterday about their pledge on getting young people into court. First, they changed the target and now they have abolished the regulation altogether. Here, they are setting a target but saying, ''If we do not meet it, so be it—we will change it.'' In other words, it is meaningless. It is a sign that the Government are beginning to lose it. That is worrying enough, but to find evidence of the fact in legislation that we might hope will be in force for a considerable time is of particular import. I want to hear from the Minister why they chose 21 days and why, having chosen that period, we assume with some thought, they want to take the power to change it at any time.

David Jamieson: I wonder how the hon. Gentleman sleeps at night with all the dreadful things that the Government are supposedly doing. The period of 21 days was not just plucked out of the air. That length of time has been used in previous legislation and is the normal period for an appeal in domestic cases—that is where it came from.
 The hon. Gentleman also said that it takes the Government a long time to answer letters. I hope that he was not referring to my Department, which has a very good record in Whitehall and Westminster on responding to hon. Members in correspondence. Although my Department probably gets almost twice as much correspondence per Minister than any other Department, we have the equal best record on responding in good time. I say that for the assistance of the Committee, because there has been a slur against some Departments in relation to their responses to letters. I believe that the time of responding is actually rather better than it was prior to 1997. There may have been a period during which the hon. Gentleman himself was a Minister, although I am sure that he was excellent in responding. 
 The amendment would remove the power to make regulations prescribing a period longer than the 21 days specified in the Bill for a disqualification to take effect in which to lodge an appeal or to produce a license following disqualification. The power to make regulations will be used only if we conclude that a longer period should be prescribed in which the specified actions should occur. Such regulations would not make provision for different time lengths in different circumstances—the time lengths would be common to all cases. A decision to give effect to a foreign disqualification necessitates giving the offender notice that he is disqualified. Although the offender should have been aware of the proceedings, the notice given under the clause will be used to inform the driver of disqualification in the United Kingdom. 
 We consider that the period of 21 days before the disqualification takes effect is both reasonable and appropriate. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has another figure in mind—he has not tabled an amendment to that effect—but I should be interested to know if he does. We are a listening Government and I should be very happy to hear any suggestion that he has to make. The provisions allow for the delivery of the notice and give time for the 
 driver either to surrender his or her license or to consider lodging an appeal. Reference is made to the period currently allowed in which to lodge an appeal against a domestic disqualification from a decision of a magistrates court. 
 The power to prescribe a period longer than 21 days is needed, because it would allow us to make adjustments in line with any changes to the appeal court and also, in the light of experience, in the operation of convention procedures. To some extent, we are sailing into uncharted waters in relation to co-operation between countries. If drivers consistently experience difficulties in complying with the requirements within the 21-day period currently specified, we need to be able to prescribe a longer period. The regulations would therefore not prescribe criteria for the automatic extension for the time limits laid down in the Bill. 
 I hope that that has assuaged the hon. Gentleman's concerns, because he seems to have got himself rather worried on the last two groups of amendments and convinced himself that the Government are up to some subterfuge. I can assure him that that is not the case.

James Paice: We understand why the Minister has not been nominated for eviction from the Big Brother house yet. His commitment to the cause is obviously absolute and he has endeavoured to persuade us of the validity of his case, however thin it may be.
 My comments about responses to correspondence were not specific to his Department, but they were definitely specific to the whole Government. I have files that I can happily show the Minister to illustrate that and would remind him that the previous Government—in which he rightly said I was a Minister—regularly published the times that it took each Department to respond to correspondence. 
 The Minister explained, perfectly cogently, why the period of 21 days is needed. It is already in plenty of other pieces of legislation, and so is perfectly reasonable. However, I fail to understand why it is necessary to expect that that period will not be long enough. The Minister said that we are sailing into uncharted waters, which I suspect is quite an admission and demonstrates the validity of my case, which is that the Government do not quite know the implications of what we legislating for. That issue is worrying and is part of a trend. Whether the Minister thinks that I am getting over-excited about it is a matter for his judgment, and I assure him that I do not sleep at night owing to all sorts of problems that the Government are causing the country.

David Jamieson: Would the hon. Gentleman accept, especially under the circumstances, that some flexibility is sensible for whomsoever would form the Government in the future?

James Paice: I accept, as I have already made clear in other debates in which we have referred to the 1990 Act—although it does not apply to this chapter—that legislation sometimes needs to be changed. There may be occasions, when conventions have been in existence for a number of years, when we see the need to make changes. However, I am concerned that the Government are taking the power to make those
 changes on the hoof. We have had a debate on the matter, I have heard what the Minister has to say, and there is probably little more to be gained from pursing the matter. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

James Paice: I want to ask the Minister a brief question. Subsection (2) defines
''the unexpired period of the foreign disqualification''
 as the period less whatever sentence has been served 
''in the State in which the offender was convicted.''
 It occurs to me, bearing in mind that we are talking about a convention to which a number of countries are signatory, that similar measures apply to many countries. Therefore, some part of the period of disqualification may be served in other countries, not just the state in which the offender was convicted. The way that the clause is written makes it seem that that period is not counted, and all that it counted is the period served in their own state. Unless I have misunderstood something else in the clause, there is a point here that the Minister may wish examine. It seems reasonable that if a person who has been disqualified serves some of the disqualification in another country that is a signatory to the same convention, then that should be considered as part of the period.

David Jamieson: I am advised that disqualification cannot be served in the other country—it can be served only in the state of the offence. There would be enormous complications in trying to alter that. I will look at the matter to see whether we can be clear about how the system operates. There will probably be very few cases but, nevertheless, that is not unimportant.

James Paice: I am grateful to the Minister, and I hope that it is as unimportant as he thinks. We are talking about countries within the EU, but potentially many more countries might be involved. We know that there is huge movement of people, and it is perfectly reasonable that someone could be disqualified from driving in, say, Germany, then move to France, which is also a signatory to the convention. For example, someone could be disqualified for 12 months in Germany, spend two months in Germany, then move to France which, by virtue of its equivalent legislation, could apply the same measure, and spend eight months disqualified there. By then, that person would have done 10 months and have two months left to serve, according to my calculations but, according to this legislation, when they then pass through the channel tunnel to Britain, they would have 10 months left to serve. That is totally wrong. If the Minister wishes to consult his officials, and come back to me before I conclude, he can by all means do so. I hope that he has taken what I have said on board. Given that we are talking about countries just across the channel with which we are close in many ways, and given the fact that people move through those countries so frequently, I wholly support the totality of the measures. The general public will also support them
 because they get very angry when they see people escaping the implications of their bad driving.
 I am rattling on to give the Minister a chance to get advice. Most hon. Members will have had constituency cases that highlight this issue. I have identified a problem, and I hope that the Minister will be able to assuage my fears.

David Jamieson: It was kind of the hon. Gentleman to allow me to receive some advice. I am advised that if a UK resident—as with the case that the hon. Gentleman mentioned—was disqualified from driving in France, he would be disqualified everywhere because he would have no UK licence.

James Paice: I wish that I had not given way. I confess to being even more confused than when I started. I will take the Minister's earlier remarks that he would examine this issue. Perhaps he will write to Members of the Committee with a clearer explanation than he was able to give on the spur of the moment.

David Heath: I will not make it any clearer. I agree with the hon. Gentleman's original proposition, but I wonder whether the country of residence does not stop the clock running as far as the original disqualification is concerned in the country where the offence took place. At the end of the 10-month period, 10 months would expire in France despite the fact that the offender had been living in Germany. It may come to the same thing, but it needs examination to ensure that that is the case.

James Paice: The hon. Member was correct when he said that he would not make the issue any clearer. I have raised the matter, and I look forward to the Minister's response.

David Jamieson: For absolute clarity, I will look at the precise circumstances that the hon. Gentleman mentioned, and make sure that he gets a full response.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59 - Appeal against disqualification

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 110, in
clause 59, page 39, line 31, leave out 'given to' and insert 'served upon'.
 Some might call this amendment a quibble over legal jargon. We are suggesting that the words ''given to'' do not constitute a legal term, and that the use of the term ''served upon'' would be more appropriate. I am not sure what in legal terms would be defined as having been ''given to'' the applicant, where as ''served upon'' is clearly a recognised legal statement about the method of that service. ''Given to'' is a much looser phrase, at least as I understand it; I am not a lawyer. I am not sure whether it is definitive enough.

David Jamieson: I hope that I do not further confuse the hon. Gentleman. The amendment would introduce an inconsistency with other parts of Bill, principally clause 57, which states that the appropriate Minister:
''must give the offender a notice under this section''.
 The amendment might imply a different intended meaning, where of course none is meant. Clause 58 already provides that a notice given under clause 57 must be in writing. The procedure that we have provided for the delivery of a notice is explained more fully in clause 71, to which we will come shortly. That requires that a notice to an individual under the relevant chapter may be given to him by 
''delivering it to him . . . leaving it at his proper address, or . . . sending it to him by post.''
 The individual's proper address is his latest address as known to the appropriate Minister. 
 The expression ''service'' includes giving or sending. Under section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978, the service of any document in the post is deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting a letter containing the document. It is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post, unless the contrary is shown. I hope that that helps the hon. Gentleman.

James Paice: I am grateful. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 59 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 60 - Power of appellate courts in

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: I want to be absolutely clear about the grounds for appeal under clause 60 for a suspension of the disqualification. Under clause 59, the only grounds for appeal appear to be that section 57 does not apply. In other words, it is not possible to argue the correctness or otherwise of the facts of the original case or the verdict of a court that applied the original disqualification. The only matter is whether the disqualification exists and whether it falls within the context of clause 57
 That does not appear to be the case under clause 60. Am I right or wrong? Clause 60 does not appear to have the same qualifications, so I presume that it opens a door to a person who is disqualified under clause 57 to have that disqualification suspended on any grounds, including the facts of the original case. If that is not right, where does it say that?

David Jamieson: I can give the hon. Gentleman the assurance that any appeal will not be on the substance of the case, but only on whether the process was duly followed.

David Heath: I am not clear where it says that in the Bill. It says simply that
''the court may, if it thinks fit, suspend the qualification.''
 There is not any elaboration of why it should think fit to do that. As far as I can understand it, clause 57 does 
 not qualify clause 60 or the subsequent Scottish and Northern Irish provisions.

David Jamieson: To help the hon. Gentleman, I can jot him a line and get the legal definition tied up for him. I am assured that an appeal can be only on the process rather than the case, but if he wants to know the precise legal process in the Bill, I shall be happy to provide it.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 61 to 78 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 79 - Disability and prospective disability

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Lady Hermon: I rise to speak particularly in relation to Northern Ireland. The Minister will be well aware, following the Good Friday agreement, that the Northern Ireland Act 1998 made certain provision in relation to promoting equality of opportunity between disabled and able-bodied persons. That was a good development, if I may say so. I am therefore concerned that, in relation to the Bill, the appropriate authority is the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland. Can the Minister clarify the implications of the statutory duty on that Department to promote equality of opportunity for those with disabilities, which covers their ability to travel to their job or to travel throughout Northern Ireland? How does the clause sit with the statutory obligation to promote quality of opportunity for disabled people in Northern Ireland?

David Jamieson: I cannot see anything in the Bill that would inhibit the Department of the Environment from carrying out that particular work. I do not entirely understand the point that the hon. Lady makes. Nothing will inhibit the Department from carrying out that particular duty. The clause is concerned only with disabilities that impact on a person's driving ability.

Lady Hermon: I say it in relation to a gentlemen who suffered from polio when a teenager. He worked for a considerable time in Cambridge and chose to retire to the wonderful constituency of North Down, where he was required to undertake another assessment. Under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, every Department, including the Department of the Environment, has a duty to promote equality of opportunity between disabled and able-bodied people. Every person from the rest of the United Kingdom who had worked in any establishment and who came to Northern Ireland would not have had to sit another assessment. I want to hear from the Minister that those with disabilities will not be at a disadvantage under the clause. It is very simple.

David Jamieson: I cannot see them being disadvantaged in any way under the clause, because it merely equalises treatment in both parts of the United Kingdom.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Heppell.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at thirteen minutes to Six o'clock till Thursday 19 June at ten minutes past Nine o'clock.